Citizen-centric Governance Indicators: Measuring and Monitoring Governance by Listening to the People by Maksym Ivanyna & Anwar Shah









Since the publication of pioneering work on measur-
ing governance quality by Huther and Shah (1998),
there has been a proliferation of composite world-
wide governance indicators purporting to measure
various aspects of governance quality (see Arndt
2008a for the history and politics of governance rat-
ings). The growth of these indicators has been
spurred by generous support by the development
assistance community, especially multilateral devel-
opment finance agencies, and the infinite appetite of
media and the academic community for governance
assessments and country rankings. Governance indi-
cators are now being used as tools for conducting
development dialog, allocating external assistance
and influencing foreign direct investment. Each new
indicator series is now released with great fanfare
from major industrial country capitals and the pop-
ular press uses these indicators to name and shame
individual countries for any adverse change in rank
order over time or across countries. The develop-
ment assistance community is increasingly using
these indicators in making critical judgments on
development assistance. The World Bank’s In-
ternational Association (IDA) allocation – a window
of subsidized lending to the developing world and
the United States Agency for International
Development’s Millennium Challenge Account uses
various governance indicators as criteria for allocat-
ing external assistance. At the same time, some of
the recent findings of these indicators have also led
to much controversy and acrimony and thereby con-
tributing to complicating the dialogue on develop-
ment effectiveness.1 In view of the influential nature
of these indicators and potential to do harm if judg-
ments embodied in these indicators are biased and
erroneous, it is imperative that they capture critical
dimensions of the quality of governance and all
countries are evaluated using uniform and reason-
ably objective assessment criteria.
Do the existing indicators meet this test? While the
literature on this subject is woefully inadequate and
thin, four widely used indicators-namely the World
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs),
Overseas Development Institute’s World Gov-
ernance Assessments (WGAs), Mo Ibrahim Foun-
dation’s Indexes of African Governance (IIAGs) and
the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa’s African Governance Report Indicators
(AGRIs) – all lack a conceptual framework on gov-
ernance, as well as citizen-based evaluations; their
time and country assessment inconsistencies also
make their rankings suspect (see Figures 1–3 for
examples of these inconsistencies). A number of
recent papers have been especially critical of WGIs
for lacking ‘concept’(implying lack of clarity in con-
ceptualization) and ‘construct’ (implying lack of
clarity in measurement) validity, sample bias (mostly
interest group views), lack of transparency and time
inconsistency of definitions and measurements (see
Arndt 2008a; Arndt 2008b; Arndt and Oman 2006,
Kurtz and Schrank 2007; Iqbal and Shah 2008;
Langbein and Knack 2008; Schrank and Kurtz 2008;
Thomas 2006). One of the most important limitation
common to all available composite indexes of gover-
nance is that they fail to capture how citizens per-
ceive the governance environment and outcomes in
their own countries.
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voice and accountability in China is worse than Zimbabwe; and mil-
itary coup de’tat in October 1999 led to improved voice and account-
ability in Pakistan.For governance assessments to be useful for policy
purposes, they must conceptualize governance and
provide uniform and consistent criteria for measuring
governance across countries and over time. Foremost
concerns for such measurement should be citizens’
evaluation of governance environment and outcomes
in their own countries supplemented of course by
objective indicators of the same. For development
assistance purposes, these indica-
tors could be supplemented by
experts-based evaluations. There
is some work available on objec-
tive indicators as done by the
Doing Business indicators of the
World Bank and on experts-
based evaluations as done for the
Global Integrity Index. The most
important void in our knowledge
is how citizens view governance
environment and outcomes in
their countries. This paper takes a
first step to fill that void.
The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. The following section
discusses conceptual issues in
measuring governance, specifies a
citizen-centric conceptual frame-
work on measuring governance quality. The third sec-
tion describes an empirical framework, data sources
and aggregation techniques. The fourth section pre-
sents preliminary results. In the fifth section we dis-
cuss the robustness of our results, followed by the
contributions and limitations of the empirical
approach in the final section.
Conceptualizing and measuring
governance quality in a 
comparative context
Governance is a fuzzy yet fash-
ionable buzzword and its use in
the literature has exploded in
recent years. Dixit (2008) notes
that there were only 4 citations in
EconLit in the period 1970–1979
compared to 15,455 in the most
recent period of 2000–2007 and
currently Google lists more than
152,000 pages of this literature.
According to American Heritage,
Random House and Merriam
Webster dictionaries, governance
is equated with government and
is defined as the ‘exercise of
authority and control’ or ‘a
method or system of government
and management’ or ‘the act,
process or power of governing’.
Huther and Shah (1996 and
1998) defined governance as a































INCONSISTENCY OF WEIGHTS ACROSS COUNTRIES:




Notes: WMRC – The Worlds Markets Research Center, WEF – The World Economic
Forum, MIG – Grey Area Dynamics Ratings by the Merchant International Group, IMD –
The International Institute for Management Development, FH – The Freedom House, EIU
– The Economist Intelligence Unit, CU – the State Capacity survey by the Center of









































INCONSISTENCY OF WEIGHTS ACROSS COUNTRIES USED BY THE WORLDWIDE
Notes: WMO – Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators, WCY – Institute
for Management and Development World Competitiveness Worldbook, USD – USAID,
QLM – Business Environment Risk Intelligence, PRS – Political Risk Services
International Country Risk Guide, PRC – Political Economic Risk Consultancy Corruption
in Asia Survey, PIA – World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments, MIG –
Merchant International Group, LOB – Latinobarometro, GCS – World Economic Forum
Global Competitiveness Report, GAL – Gallup International, FNT – Freedom House, EIU
– Economist Intelligence Unit, DRI – Global Insight Global Risk Service, CDU – Columbia
University State’s Capacity Survey, CCR – Freedom House Countries at Crossroads, BRI
– Bertelsman Foundation, BPS – Business Enterprise Environment Survey, ASD – Asian
Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments, AGI – United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa, AFR – Afrobarometer, ADB – African Development Bank
Country Policy and Institutional Assessments.
Source: Arndt (2008b).
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multi-faceted concept encompassing all aspects of the
exercise of authority through formal and informal
institutions in the management of the resource
endowment of a state. The quality of governance is
thus determined by the impact of this exercise of
power on the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens.
The World Bank Governance and Anti-corruption
(GAC) Strategy defines it as the manner in which
public officials and institutions acquire and exercise
the authority to shape public policy and provide
goods and services (World Bank 2007).
For our current purpose, none of the above defini-
tions with the exception by Huther and Shah (1996
and 1998) is helpful in serving as an operational
guide to carry out a comparative review of quality
of governance across countries or even of one coun-
try over time. This is because of their singular focus
on the processes/institutions which do not lend
themselves to easy or fair comparability across
countries and sometimes not even within one coun-
try without conducting deeper analytical studies.
There can be little disagreement that same processes
and institutions can lead to divergent governance
outcomes just as dissimilar processes could yield
similar outcomes in two different countries. For
example, anti-corruption agencies in countries with
fair governance helps curtail corruption but in coun-
tries with poor governance prove either to be inef-
fective or worse a tool for corrupt practices and vic-
timization (Shah 2007). As another example, budget
secrecy prior to its presentation
to the parliament is just as im-
portant under parliamentary
form of government as in
Canada, Britain, India, New
Zealand, as open and participa-
tory budget determination pro-
cess is to presidential form of
government as in the United
States. There can be little dis-
agreement that both types of
processes have the potential to
advance public interest but may
succeed or fail in different coun-
try circumstances. During the
past two decades, we have also
seen that single party dominant
political systems in China,
Malaysia and Singapore have
shown dramatic results in im-
proving governance outcomes
whereas pluralistic party sys-
tems have also shown positive results in other coun-
tries such as Brazil and India. Similarly monarchy
has shown positive results in Britain but unwelcome
results in Nepal. Even similar electoral processes do
not always lead to representative democracy and
may instead yield aristocracy (elite capture) in some
countries and corrupt oligarchies in others. In fact,
Aristotle’s main argument for elections was based
upon the premise that these would produce aristoc-
racy, a form of government he considered superior
to median voter rule (see Azfar 2008). 
Andrews (2008, 2) argues that such “good gover-
nance picture of effective government constitutes a
threat, promoting isomorphism, institutional dual-
ism and ‘flailing states’ and imposing an inappropri-
ate model of government that ‘kicks away the ladder’
today’s effective government climbed to reach their
current state”. In any case, such comparisons of
processes and institutions out of their context are
almost always ideologically driven and value laden
and could not be acceptable as unbiased profession-
al (scientific) judgments. This also explains that
while citizens of Bangladesh, China, India and
Malaysia over the last decade have experienced
remarkable improvement in governance outcomes,
available primary indicators fail to capture these
accomplishments due to their focus on processes at
the neglect of outcomes. Even for the world as a
whole, the information revolution by letting the sun






















Albania as an example
INCONSISTENCY OF WGI WEIGHTS OVER TIME
1996: CC = 0.64 DRI + 0.36 PRS
1998: CC = 0.14 DRI + 0.03 PRS + 0.13 WBS + 0.44 FHT + 0.26 PIA




Notes: pia – World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments, gal – Gallup
International, fht – Freedom House Nations in Transition, bps – Business Enterprise
Environment Survey, wmo – Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators, wbs
– World Business Environment Survey, prs – Political Risk Services International Country
Risk Guide, dri – Global Insight Global Risk Service, cdu – Columbia University State
Capacity Project.
Source: Arndt (2008b).dramatic improvements in government accountabili-
ty, but the WGIs with their on one-size-fit all vision
of the world, have consistently failed to notice or
recognize such a mega change. 
These indicators rank China in the lowest percentile
on voice and accountability but according to the for-
mer Auditor General of Canada, China has the most
effective public accounts committee anywhere which
has a track record of holding government to account
for malfeasance (Dye 2007). Furthermore local gov-
ernments in China have relatively much larger role in
public service provision than in most countries. Local
governments below the provincial level account for
about 54 percent of consolidated public expenditures
in China compared to about 4 percent in India and
about 27 percent in OECD countries (Shah and Shah
2006). Thus having the decision making closer to peo-
ple, directly elected local governments, and party
oversight of local government performance – all work
to create a system of voice and accountability that is
quite unique to China and not easily comparable to
other countries (Qiao and Shah 2006). China has also
demonstrated superior government effectiveness
through its unique and unparalleled success in allevi-
ating poverty and improving the quality of life of its
citizens over the past two decades. About two decades
ago, China had about 35 percent of its population
below poverty level compared to less than 2 percent in
2006 (Shah and Shen 2007).
In conclusions comparisons of governance institu-
tions requires deeper analytical work through in-
depth comparative studies rather than aggregate indi-
cators. Such indicators are more usefully used to com-
pare governance outcomes and complementary ana-
lytical studies of institutions and process can be used
to explain varying outcomes. Of course, governance
outcomes also assume commonly shared values but it
is relatively less problematic than one-size fit-all pre-
scriptions on processes.
To have meaningful governance comparisons across
countries and over time, one needs to have concepts
which are somewhat invariant to time and place and
are focused on citizens’evaluations rather than inter-
est groups’ views. To this end, we define governance
as an exercise of authority and control to preserve
and protect public interest and enhance the quality
of life enjoyed by citizens. Note that this definition
encompasses both the governance environment
(quality of institutions and processes) as well as gov-
ernance outcomes.
Towards a simple framework for assessing country 
governance quality
Considering a neo-institutional perspective, various
orders of government (agents) are created to serve,
preserve, protect and promote public interest based
upon the values and expectations of the citizens of a
state (principals). Underlying assumption is that there
is a widely shared notion of the public interest. In
return, governments are given coercive powers to
carry out their mandates. A stylized view of this pub-
lic interest can be characterized by four dimensions of
governance outcomes.
• Responsive governance. The fundamental task of
governing is to promote and pursue collective
interest while respecting formal (rule of law) and
informal norms. This is done by government creat-
ing an enabling environment to do the right things
– that is it promotes and delivers services consis-
tent with citizen preferences. Further, the govern-
ment carries out only the tasks that it is authorized
to do that is it follows the compact authorized by
citizens at large.
• Fair (equitable) governance. For peace, order
and good government, the government mediates
conflicting interests, is focused on consensus
building and inclusiveness and ensures a sense of
participation by all and protection of the poor,
minorities and disadvantaged members of the
society.
• Responsible governance. The government does it
right i.e. governmental authority is carried out fol-
lowing due process with integrity (absence of cor-
ruption), with fiscal prudence, with concern for
providing the best value for money and with a view
to earning trust of the people.
• Accountable governance. Citizens can hold the gov-
ernment to account for all its actions. This requires
that the government lets sunshine in on its opera-
tions and works to strengthen voice and exit
options for principals. It also means that govern-
ment truly respects the role of countervailing for-
mal and informal institutions of accountability in
governance. 
Given the focus on governance outcomes, Table 1 pre-
sents some preliminary ideas for discussion on how to
operationalize these concepts in individual country
assessments.
The above simple framework captures most aspects
of governance outcomes especially those relevant
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for development policy dialogue and can serve as a
useful starting point for a consensus framework to
be developed. In any event, there can be little dis-
agreement that one cannot embark on measuring
governance quality without first defining and
defending an appropriate framework that measures
governance – a point also emphasized by (Thomas
2006) and the European Commission (see Nardo et
al. 2005). Once a consensus framework is developed
then one needs to focus on only a few key indicators
that represent citizens’ evaluations and could be
measurable with some degree of confidence in most
countries of the world and could be defended for
their transparency and reasonable degree of com-
parability and objectivity.2 Having an enormous
number of indicators which could not be scruti-
nized is nothing but a distinct disadvantage for a
measure that aims for wider acceptance and confi-
dence. 
Implementation of the above framework requires a
worldwide survey with uniform questionnaire honing
on the four dimensions of governance identified
above across countries. Given that such a survey is not
available and costly to commission, in the following
section, we take a pragmatic approach based upon
available survey data to develop rough indexes of gov-
ernance quality. 
Citizen-centric governance: empirical framework 
Our procedure of the governance assessment consists
of the two main steps. First, data source – the raw
data from inter-country public opinion survey – is
chosen. The responses on questions in the survey,
which characterize governance outcomes as in Table
1, are recorded. Second, the responses are aggregated
in order to achieve governance index for each country
from the sample.
In what follows, we consider both of the steps in
details.
Table 1 
Governance outcomes and relevant considerations
 Relevant considerations
Responsive governance - public services consistent with citizen preferences;
- direct possibly interactive democracy;
- safety of life, liberty and property;
- peace, order, rule of law;
- freedom of choice and expression;
- improvements in economic and social outcomes;
- improvements in quantity, quality and access of public services; and 
- improvements in quality of life.
Fair governance - fulfillment of citizens’ values and expectations in relation to participation,
social justice, and due process;
- access of the poor, minorities and disadvantaged groups to basic public
services; 
- non-discriminatory laws and enforcement;
- egalitarian income distribution; and 
- equal opportunity for all.
Responsible
governance
- open, transparent and prudent economic, fiscal and  financial
  management; 
- working better and costing less;
- ensuring integrity of its operations;
- earning trust;
- managing risks;
- competitive service delivery; and
- focus on results.
Accountable
governance
- justice-able rights and due process
- access to justice,  information;
- judicial integrity and independence;
- effective legislature and civil society oversight;
- recall of officials and rollbacks of program possible;
- effective limits to government intervention; and 
- effective restraints to special interest capture. 
Source: Shah (2008).
2 See Andrews and Shah (2005) for details and relevant indicators of
an approach that emphasizes citizen-centric governance; and Shah
and Shah (2006) for citizen-centered local governance and relevant
indicators.Data
Ideally one needs a worldwide survey with uniform
questionnaire focused on aspects of governance
highlighted in Table 1. The data must also be avail-
able for free so that other researchers are able to
replicate and verify results. Such a survey, however,
is not currently available. Instead a wide range of
surveys with varying methodologies and coverage
are available. It is tempting to draw upon these
sources as done by the Worldwide Governance
Indicators. However as Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2001) has argued that even the small difference in
the formulation of a question (assigned to the same
sub-criterion) or the sequence of questions in a sur-
vey may bring significant discrepancies in the
responses for the same country and same sub-crite-
rion. Following this advice, we have used the World
Values Survey (WVS) as the primary source of the
data. The WVS uses a uniform questionnaire that is
applied in 97 countries. The survey, however, does
not cover all countries in the same years and it is
primarily focused on cultural values with limited
number of questions of direct relevance to the mea-
surement of governance quality. However, each
aspects of governance noted in Table 1 has sufficient
number of questions to get reasonable first esti-
mates. To enhance coverage to an additional
28 countries, we supplemented these data with four
other surveys of the same genre i.e. uniform ques-
tionnaire and data is publicly available free of
charge, namely Afrobarometer, Asiabarometer,
Global Corruption Barometer and the World
Gallup Poll. This enabled us to construct a unique
data set covering 421,994 responses on 74 questions
covering 125 countries. The records in the dataset
can be sorted by the gender, income, education of a
respondent, as well as by the sub national adminis-
trative unit of his/her residency. The dataset is avail-
able from the authors upon request.
Our main estimation procedure is done for 3 waves of
the World Values Surveys based on the year when the
surveys were taken. Wave 1 includes countries sur-
veyed from 1994 to 1998, wave 2 – from 1999 to 2004,
and wave 3 – from 2004 to 2008. In addition to ques-
tions from WVS, in the wave 3 we also use one ques-
tion about corruption from Transparency Inter-
national’s Global Corruption Barometer (TI 2005).
As an alternative to the WVS, we also report results
when using Gallup World Poll data points for four
questions, which are available freely from the World
Bank Institute website (see WBI 2008).3
Aggregation
The underlying assumption of our empirical investi-
gation is that the quality of governance in a given
country is best judged by the citizens themselves
rather than foreigners. At the same time, answers of
the respondents are random variables, which are sub-
ject to errors:
(1)
where i = 1..M is the index of a country, j = 1..Ni is the
index of a respondent (total number of respondents,
obviously, changes from country to country), and
k = 1..K is the index of a question in a survey (thus of
a particular governance outcome). sijk is the answer on
question k of the respondent j in the country i. Each
response was normalized by us on a scale from 0 to 1,
with 0 being the worst answer, and 1 being the best
answer. gi is the quality of governance in the country
i, which obviously does not depend neither on con-
crete respondent, nor on specific question. Coefficient
ßk reflects the degree, to which governance affects the
answer of a respondent. Note that it does not depend
on a country or a respondent. Finally, 
is the personal random error of the respondent j in the
country i, which may also depend on a specific ques-
tion. Each error is independently normally distributed
with zero mean and the variance σ2
ik, which may
depend on the country and the specific question.
The expression for gi can be rewritten:
(2)
where
are the question-specific weights assigned to each ques-
tion. The weights are normalized to add up to one –
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3 Gallup World Poll, is itself very expensive (28 thousands US dol-
lars per year) and also does not have governance focus, and therefore
cannot be used as a base for a rigorous and replicable research.
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– so that gi is between 0 and 1 for every country. For
our main estimation, and for further comparative
analysis, the weights are exogenously chosen. They
reflect the relative importance of every question in
assessment of governance (i.e. ‘satisfaction with life
in general’ is clearly more comprehensive than ‘satis-
faction with health’ or ‘satisfaction with environ-
ment’), as well as alleviate certain data deficiencies
(i.e. European countries were not asked some ques-
tions in the second wave of WVS, so these questions
received lower weights). At the same time, the
weights can be easily changed to tailor one’s specific
research agenda or check the robustness of the
results reported here.
Given our assumptions, the most efficient, unbiased,
and consistent estimator for the governance in coun-
try i is just the sample mean of weighted averages of
citizens’ responses, the estimator for the governance’s
variance is adjusted sample variation:
(3)
We chose not to use more sophisticated data mining
approaches (e.g. principal component analysis or ran-
dom projections) for the sake of transparency, sim-
plicity and replicability. The choice of weights or
aggregate procedure does not significantly alter the
overall assessment of governance quality (see Ivanyna
and Shah 2010 for details). Our procedure is maxi-
mally open and simple in order to allow for further
research and analysis. Besides, in addition to the gov-
ernance scores we report and analyze the responses on
each separate question, which makes our indicators
‘actionable’, and allows drawing the conclusions
which are completely independent of weights and
aggregation procedure. 
Citizen-centric governance: worldwide rankings
In the following, citizen-centric governance indica-
tors are presented for most countries in the world
using the three waves of World Values Surveys and
the Gallup World Poll. This is followed by reflec-
tions upon these results in comparison to the
Worldwide Governance Indicators. Finally sub-
national governance indices for Germany and Italy
are portrayed. 
Mapping of country rankings: waves 1 to 3
Worldwide ranking of countries on governance quali-
ty are mapped in Figure 4 (World Value Survey 2005)
and Figure 5 (Gallup World Poll). All three waves of
survey are shown in Figure 4: (a) wave 1 – for surveys
taken between 1994 and 1998 (53 countries), (b) wave
2 – for surveys taken between 1999 and 2004 (71 coun-
tries), and (c) wave 3 – for surveys taken between 2005
and 2008 (51 countries). In Figure 4, we rank our sam-
ple of countries into three broad categories of gover-
nance quality and six governance rankings in Figure 5:
from dark-green high-governance-quality countries to
light-green low-governance-quality countries. While
developed countries (especially Scandinavian coun-
tries and Switzerland) show high stable governance
rankings, contrary to WGIs but not surprisingly, the
East Asian countries (especially, Vietnam, China) are
also highly rated by their citizens. The governments of
Central and Eastern European countries, on the other
hand, are rated poorly by their citizens and are always
in the lowest percentiles in worldwide rankings. 
In Figure 6, we compare citizen-centric governance
indicators with corresponding Worldwide Govern-
ance Indicators (WBI 2008), which are (in our view
mistakenly) considered as the ‘gold standard’ of gov-
ernance assessment by the popular media. The scale
changes from dark-green for countries, which were
severely under-rated by WGIs, to dark-red for coun-
tries, which were greatly over-rated. 27 out of
82 countries in our sample were over- or under-rated
at a significance level less than 25 percent (9 at a level
less than 5 percent) by WGIs in comparison to our
assessments. The East Asian countries are mostly
underrated with China, and Vietnam being the lead-
ing outliers, while Central and Eastern European
countries are over-rated by WGIs with Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova and Hungary being the leading
outliers. Our indicators are not value laden and sim-
ply capture growing satisfaction of citizens of East
Asia with their governments in improving quality of
governance over the past decades, whereas the WGIs
in view of their focus on the Anglo-Saxon institution-
al design of a government appear unable to capture
governance quality improvements associated with dif-
ferent cultural and institutional contexts. For exam-
ple, China is ranked relatively low on government
effectiveness by the WGIs while it has demonstrated
superior performance in delivering public services and
ˆ  g  i =
1
Ni


































combating poverty. Its record in
poverty alleviation is unparal-
leled in the economic history of
the world. 
Group comparisons
Figure 7 presents analysis of gov-
ernance outcomes by groups of
countries. Here we depict region-
al averages by each governance
outcome (based on the data from
the third wave of WVS). It can be
seen that the governance ranking
curve of the EU-15 group – ‘old’
members of the European Union
– is almost always above other
curves in the dimension of Re-
sponsive governance (till the
‘happiness’ point on the x-axis).
When it comes to the questions
about Responsible and Account-
able governance (confidence in
parliament, government, press,
TV, courts) the curve steeps
down. The governance ranking
curve of the East Asian coun-
tries, while mostly above the
world average, rises above the
curve of EU-15 only on trust-
related dimensions. The curve of
Central and Eastern European
countries (CEE) is always below
the East Asian curve, as well as
below the world average. The cit-
izens of CEE countries give rela-
tively very low rankings to police
(‘safety’on x-axis) and respect for
human rights in their respective
countries (‘human rights’ on the
x-axis). 
The fact that people in the East
Asia, trust their governments
more than the people in industri-
al countries is understood as
these countries have experienced
positive economic, social and
governance transformation in
recent years. However, in some
instances, there may also be bias-
es. In politically repressed coun-
tries, people may not be forth-
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Figure 4
CITIZEN-CENTRIC GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (WAVES 1–3)
Source: World Value Survey (WVS) database.
Source: Gallup World Poll (GWP) database.
Figure 5 
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coming to express their true assessment of the gover-
nance environment and outcomes. Also, when mass
media in a country is controlled by the government,
people may be indoctrinated to believe in false truths.
We test for presence such effects in our data later in
this paper. 
Intertemporal comparisons
The inter-temporal consistency of WVS question-
naires and repeated surveys during three waves allow
us to assess changes governance quality over time in
selected countries. In particular,
citizens of 41 country were sur-
veyed both during the first wave
of WVS (1994–1998) and during
the second wave (1999–2004).
Surveys both from the second
wave and the third wave
(2005–2008) are available for
33 countries. An analysis of
changes in governance quality is
reported in Figure 8. It is worth-
while noting that WGIs, in con-
trast, to analysis reported here,
assume that governance quality
remains invariant over time.
The results reported in Figure 8
show that there was statistically
significantly increase in gover-
nance quality (at significance
level of less than 1 percent) from
wave 1 to wave 2 – in contrast to
the WGI’s world of unchanging governance quality –
but no statistically significant change from wave 2 to
wave 3. The principal driver of the growth in world’s
quality of governance was increasing (in practically
all regions) satisfaction of the citizens with improve-
ment in economic and social outcomes and attendant
improvements in governance environment. This trend
continued unabated from wave 2 to wave 3 but the
overall progress was apparently mitigated by the fall
of confidence in governments, courts and army in
developing and transition countries, though CEE
countries still ended up progressing from wave 2 to
wave 3. 
Subnational CGIs
Assessing governance quality at
the sub-national levels is impor-
tant for determining the impact
of decentralization policies,
knowledge about regional equity
and discovering early signs of
potential threats to national
unity. However, such assessments
have not been carried to-date due
to a lack of appropriate frame-
work and associated data.
Fortunately, our dataset and
empirical framework enables us
to rank governance quality at
sub-national levels in most coun-
tries. The idea is to aggregate cit-
Figure 6
HOW DO WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS STACK UP AGAINST
CITIZEN-CENTRIC GOVERNANCE INDICATORS? 
Note: u. X-Y% means that the country was underestimated by WGI in comparison to CGI
at the significance level between X and Y%; o. X-Y% means that the country was overes-
timated by WGI in comparison to CGI at the significance level between X and Y%. The time














































































































































































World EU-15 CEE East Asia
Source: Authors' calculation. 
GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES: WVS-WAVE 3
Notes: World – the whole sample, EU-15 – countries from European Union, CEE – Central and Eastern 
European countries, East Asia – East Asian countries (China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam, 
Thailand).
Figure 7izens’ responses not over the whole country, but over
its sub-national jurisdictions. For the wave 3 of WVS
there are 1,121 sub-national jurisdictions in our sam-
ple – these include for some countries, all second tier
administrative jurisdictions and for others only
groups of second tier jurisdictions. Figure 9, by way
of illustration, presents sub-national governance
rankings for Germany and Italy. Similar calculations
are possible for several more countries. In Germany,
residents in rich industrial lands of Hessen,
Nordrhein-Westfalen and Saarland together with
independent cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Berlin
are most satisfied with their governments. While rela-
tively poorer eastern states receive much lower gover-
nance ratings from their residents – only in Sachsen-
Anhalt residents gave their
Länder government close to aver-
age rating, surprising are the
average scores received by the




between richness of a sub-nation-
al jurisdiction and its govern-
ment’s score on governance qual-
ity is also maintained in Italy.
Most rich northern regions re-
ceive a governance score of more
than 0.55, while poorer Southern
regions – with the exception of
Abruzzo, Molise, and Basilicata
regions – receive a lower score.
Robustness tests
The empirical analysis presented here must be sub-
jected to rigorous testing for statistical reliability and
validity. Such tests are presented in Ivanyna and Shah
(2010) and only the conclusions of these tests are
reported below.
The public opinion in a country – especially about the
issues related to the government – might be influenced
by factors, which are not directly related to the quali-
ty of governance. These factors may include ‘intimi-
dation’ effect, when people are afraid to express their
true opinions about their govern-
ment for fear of reprisals. A sec-
ond factor frequently mentioned
in the literature, is the ‘indoctri-
nation’ effect, when mass media
in a country is used to brainwash
people. A third factor is the
degree of citizen activism and
perceived role of government in a
country. Norris (1999) observes
the emergence in the 1970s in
developed countries of ‘critical
citizens’– people who are increas-
ingly critical and demanding even
of well performing governments.
Assuming that intimidation, in-
doctrination and critical citizen-
ship affect respondents’ views
about the quality of governance,
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it is not possible to estimate the magnitude of these
effects, since ‘true’ governance quality is unobserv-
able. However, the problem can be mitigated, if we
note that for some questions about governance out-
comes there are no effects of intimidation, indoctri-
nation or critical citizenship, and for some others such
effects may be present. For instance, when an individ-
ual is asked about the satisfaction with her/his health,
it is likely that she/he will not be intimidated to tell the
truth. At the same time, questions like ‘Do you have
confidence in your government?’ are most probably
subject to all of the above mentioned effects.
Therefore, we can isolate the effect of governance on
the individual responses by taking the difference
between these questions. 
As the proxy for indoctrination we take the frequen-
cy with which an individual exposes her- or himself
to TV and press. Specifically, we use questions ‘Did
you watch TV during the last week?’ and ‘Did you
read newspapers last week?’ from the World Values
Survey. The more people watch TV or read newspa-
per the more they are likely to be exposed to possible
indoctrination. The main conclusion from our esti-
mation is that even though developing countries,
especially those in the East Asia, may have indoctri-
nation, the mass media bias is also present in many
developed countries – Japan, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United States, France. The latter might be the
outcome not of state monopoly (or dictate) on mass
media, but ideological orientation of mass media
ownership such as conservative leaning of Robert
Murdoch, the owner of Fox News. The magnitude of
the indoctrination effect ranges from 0.02 (except for
Ukraine and Rwanda, where those who watch TV are
actually more critical towards the government) to
0.12, which combined with on average 75 percent of
respondents watching TV or reading newspaper, may
lead to a decrease in our estimates of governance by
0.005–0.03 points.4
Intimidation and critical citizenship effects are mea-
sured at the country level. Specifically, as a proxy for
the intimidation level in a country we use the aver-
age score of the country in the ‘Freedom in the
World’ ranking – an annual publication of the
Freedom House, where political and civil rights of
the citizens are assessed. As for the critical citizen-
ship effect, we follow Norris (1999) in her definition
of a critical citizen, and define the country to be in
the stage of critical citizenship if it had been classi-
fied ‘free’ by the Freedom House for at least ten
years before the survey was conducted (long period
of stable democracy), and the GDP per capita in
this country (taken from IMF) was more than
10 thousands US dollars (wealthy population).
Most OECD countries together with Slovenia and
Chile form this group. 
We find that both freedom of the county and its
being in the stage of critical citizenship are highly sta-
tistically significant in explaining biases on responses
on trust-related questions in the WVS surveys. The
directions of the effects are what would be intuitively
foreseen. 1 score up in the Freedom House ranking
(which means country becomes less free, 1 being the
best score, and 7 – the worst) leads to the citizens of
this country to be more cautious in answering gov-
ernment-related questions in a survey, and conse-
quently overestimate their governments in trust-relat-
ed questions by 0.03 points. For the least-free coun-
try, the effect on our governance estimate would be –
0.07 points. On the other hand, residents of the coun-
tries, which are in a stage of critical citizenship, do
have significantly less confidence in their govern-
ments then they should have. If not too ‘critical’, res-
idents of these countries would give their govern-
ments a score 0.09 points higher, which would imply
an increase of about 0.03 in the citizen-centric gover-
nance indicator.
Even though we find statistically significant effects
of indoctrination, intimidation and critical citizen-
ship in some countries, the magnitude of these
effects is not particularly large. For example,
Vietnam is ranked 0.72 on governance but it is
ranks relatively low (rank of 6 in 2005) on the
Freedom House index, and there is a moderate
(0.05) effect of indoctrination by mass media (tele-
vision). Together these effects would cut its citizen-
centric governance indicator by 0.07 points. New
indicator would be 0.65 – still in the highest 20th
percentile of the sample. Economic stability and
growth may also lead to improvements in gover-
nance environment and the citizens’ perceptions in
governance quality (Lou and Wang 2007). At the
same time, poor economic performance, political
conflicts and corruption in the 1990s in Central and
Eastern European countries may be responsible for
low scores on governance quality for this region.
Overall, our tests confirm the robustness and valid-
ity of citizen-centric governance rankings even in
the presence of indoctrination, intimidation and
critical citizens’ effects.
4 Note that our estimates of governance are assessed on a scale from
0 to 1.Contributions and limitations of the empirical
approach
This paper has provided a conceptual framework for
measuring governance quality using citizens’ evalua-
tions consistently across countries and over time. It
further provided empirical illustration – using data
from the World Values Survey Association – of the
usefulness of the methodology by developing gover-
nance quality rankings for 125 countries. These
rankings significantly differ from those provided by
available indicators that mostly capture foreigners’
(mostly interest groups) or arm-chair experts’ opin-
ions. Further, we illustrate the usefulness of our
approach for measuring governance quality at sub-
national levels.
The WVS data are subject to important limitations.
They are not conducted in the same year for all coun-
tries, and the questionnaires may slightly differ from
country to country, which may produce significant
departures from objective estimation. It is also possi-
ble that in spite of the claims to the contrary by the
survey organization, the survey may not be based on
stratified random sampling for some countries due to
practical difficulties.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the dataset con-
structed by us has important merits. The governance-
related questions and answers are reported at the level
of individual respondents in our dataset, which gives
researchers flexibility in computing rankings across
different strata e.g. education class, by gender or by
income groups etc. Most importantly and contrary to
the WGIs, the data used in our estimation is freely
accessible, and can be used by other researchers to
replicate or modify our estimation procedure. Ideally,
our theoretical framework should be implemented
using a world poll with stratified random sampling
employing a uniform questionnaire across countries
and over time. The World Gallup Poll or a similar
instrument might offer such an opportunity in the
near future.
References
Andrews, M. (2008), Are One-Best-Way Models of Effective
Government Suitable for Developing Countries?, Faculty Research
Working Paper Series RWP08-014, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, Cambridge. 
Andrews, M. and A. Shah (2005), “Citizen-Centered Governance: A
New Approach to Public Sector Reform”, in: Shah, A. (ed.), Public
Expenditure Analysis, Washington DC: World Bank, 153–182.
Arndt, C. (2008a), “The Politics of Governance Ratings”, Inter-
national Public Management Journal 11, 275–297.
Arndt, C. (2008b), What Is Happening to the Level of Corruption in
ECA and the World, Powerpoint presentation at the World Bank,
Washington DC (mimeo).
Arndt, C. and C. Oman (2006), Uses and Abuses of Governance
Indicators, Development Center Studies, OECD, Paris.
Azfar, O. (2008), “Power to the People”, The Dawn – Daily News-
paper (Karachi, Pakistan), 26 January. 
Bertrand, M. and S. Mullainathan (2001), “Do People Mean What
They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data”, American
Economic Review 91, 67–72.
Dixit, A. (2008), Governance Institutions and Development, PREM
Seminar, World Bank, Washington DC, 10 March. 
Djankov, S. (2008), Ease of Doing Business, http://www.doingbusi-
ness.org/documents/DB09Easeofdoingbusinessrankmethod.pdf.
Dye, K. (2007), “Corruption and Fraud Detection by Supreme Audit
Institutions”, in: Shah, A. (ed.), Performance Accountability and
Combating Corruption, Washington DC: Word Bank, 303–322. 
Huther, J. and A. Shah (1996), A Simple Measure of Good
Governance, Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank,
Washington DC (mimeo).
Huther, J. and A. Shah (1998), Applying a Simple Measure of Good
Governance to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization, World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 1894.
Iqbal, K. and A. Shah (2008), Truth in Advertisement: How Do
Governance Indicators Stack Up?, World Bank Institute, Washington
DC, http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/publicfinance.
Ivanyna, M. and A. Shah (2010), Citizen-Centric Governance
Indicators: Measuring and Monitoring Governance by Listening to the
People and Not the Interest Groups, World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 5181.
Kurtz, M. and A. Schrank (2007), “Growth and Governance:
Models, Measures and Mechanism”, The Journal of Politics 69,
538–554.
Langbein, L. and S. Knack (2008), The Worldwide Governance
Indicators and Tautology, World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper 4669.
Lou, J. and S. Wang (2007, eds.), Public Finance in China: Reform and
Growth for a Harmonious Society, Washington DC: World Bank.
Nardo, M., M. Saisana, A. Saltelli and S. Tarantola (2005), Tools for
Composite Indicators Building, Working Paper, Joint Research Center,
European Commission.
Norris, P. (1999), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic
Governance, New York: Oxford University Press.
Qiao, B. and A. Shah (2006), “Local Government Organization and
Finance: China”, in: Shah, A. (ed.), Local Governance in Developing
Countries, Washington DC: World Bank, 137–168.
Schrank, A. and M. Kurtz (2008), Conceptualizing and Measuring
Institutions: A View from Political Science, Department of Political
Science, Ohio State University (mimeo). 
Shah, A. (2007), “Tailoring the Fight against Corruption to Country
Circumstances”, in: Shah, A. (ed.), Performance Accountability and
Combating Corruption, Washington DC: World Bank, 233–254.
Shah, A. (2008), “Demanding to Be Served: On Holding Government
to Account for Service Delivery”, in: De Jong, J. and G. Rizvi (eds.),
The State of the Access, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Shah, A., and S. Shah (2006), “The New Vision of Local Governance
and the Evolving Role of Local Governments”, in: Shah, A. (ed.),
Local Governance in Developing Countries, Washington, DC: World
Bank, 1–46.
Shah, A. and C. Shen (2007), “Fine Tuning the Intergovernmental
Transfer System to Create a Harmonious Society and a Level Playing
Field for Regional Development”, in: Lou, J. and S. Wang (eds.),
Public Finance in China: Reform and Growth for a Harmonious
Society, Washington DC: World Bank, 129–154. 
Thomas, M. (2006), What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators
Measure?, John Hopkins University, Washington DC (mimeo).
Thompson, T. and A. Shah (2005), Transparency International’s
Corruption Perception Index: Whose Perceptions Are They Anyway?,
World Bank Institute, Washington DC, http;//www.worldbank.org/
wbi/publicfinance.
CESifo Forum 1/2011 70
SpecialCESifo Forum 1/2011 71
Special
Transparency International (TI, 2005), Report on Transparency Inter-
national Global Corruption Barometer 2005, http://www.transparen-
cy.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2005.
Wang, Z. (2005), “Before Emergence of Critical Citizens: Economic
Development and Political Trust in China”, International Review of
Sociology 15, 155–171.
World Bank Institute (WBI, 2008), Worldwide Governance Indicators,
info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
World Values Survey (WVS, 2008), Official Datafile v.20081015,
World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org),
aggregate file producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.